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RESTRUCTURING REVISITED: 





Korea has successfully undergone economic restructuring, as compared to Japan. The
“flexibility” of Korea and “rigidity” of Japan are strongly related to the differences
between development strategies the two countries adopted. Although Korea adopted the
Japanese developmental state model, it excluded workers from the development coali-
tion. Whereas excluded workers had been a source of instability in the Korean system,
the well-found coalition of government, business, and workers in Japan had guaranteed
stability of the system. This difference was not conspicuous before the economic crises;
strong performance of the Korean economy and a heavy-handed government had
silenced discontented Korean workers. When the crisis occurred, Korean workers
demanded the overhaul of the system, while Japanese workers did not. While Japan
attempted to protect the system, Korea dismantled it due to the lack of support of the
disenchanted Korean people, in addition to pressure from IMF and foreign countries.
Though Korea has been successful in revamping its economic system and regaining
economic growth since restructuring after the economic crisis of 1997, the new system
is not stable. Workers, still not fully represented in national decision-making processes,
are calling for revision of the system, and are frequently expressing their anger. Japan,
reluctant to accept an Anglo-American economic model, is struggling to get out of a
sluggish economy, but it still enjoys a relatively stable social system.
INTRODUCTION
South Korea has undergone serious economic restructuring since the eco-
nomic crisis of 1997. It restructured its financial institutions and dismantled
rigid employment practices within a year after the economic crisis. It also
sold many state owned companies and reduced the number of public ser-
vants.1 These substantial changes occurred within three years after the eco-
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nomic crisis of 1997. In contrast, the necessity of economic restructuring in
Japan has also been raised internally and externally, due to the prolonged
economic recession since the early 1990s (Ohmae, 1990; Dore, 1998; Porter et
al., 2000). However, Japan has been unsuccessful in restructuring its econo-
my since the beginning of the recession in the 1990s. It is still debating
whether to overhaul its financial institutions since the downturn of the
country’s economy in the early 1990s (Dore, 2000; Cabinet Office, 2002).
For a long period, Korea and Japan have shared a relationship in econom-
ic development (Cumings, 1984; Eckert, 1991; Kim, 1997). Korea has success-
fully entered the world economy based on the Japanese economic develop-
ment model, i.e., export-oriented industrialization with a developmental
state apparatus. The two countries seem to share similar development
strategies and problems in their economies; they are facing challenges
against developmental state models in the era of globalization. Despite their
differences, both countries are similar in social structure and culture (Kim,
1997). 
It is intriguing why these two developmental countries show different
responses to the given external pressures to change. Under external pres-
sure to change, Korea has been “flexible,” but Japan has been “rigid” in
changing its economic structure and practices. Why do two similar coun-
tries show different responses to seemingly similar economic problems?
This paper attempts to address this question by focusing on external and
internal factors; the former is related to the severity and speed of the eco-
nomic recessions and the latter examines the institutions in each country.
We, however, put more emphasis on the institutional differences between
the two countries. It is true that external pressure is a significant leading fac-
tor for change in societies. The different responses of Korea and Japan sug-
gest why and how external pressure directs the course of change (Haggard,
1990; Haggard and Kaufman, 1994; Nelson, 1990; Zysman, 1983). These
responses have important implications for globalization. As globalization is
spreading, the nation-state appears to be a pawn in the invisible hand of the
global market (Weiss, 1998: x); however, the impact of external economic
pressures on national economies and public policies depends to a large
degree on the strength or weakness of domestic institutions (Haggard and
Kaufman, 1994; Weiss, 1998: xi).
In comparing the internal institutions of both Korea and Japan, this paper
attempts to explain differences based on socio-political factors: development
coalition, production systems and policy formation. It will review why and
how two countries formed different development coalitions. Development
coalition has a strong affinity with production system and policy formation.
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These factors, in turn, explain how people in two countries evaluate the cur-
rent political and economic system. This paper assumes that differential
evaluation coupled with different institutions in two countries have resulted
in different responses to external pressures. This paper pays special atten-
tion to the development coalition; it shows how the beneficiaries and losers
of the development react to the necessity for change and determine current
restructuring. We argue that the differences between the two countries in
supporting a development model, especially differences in development
coalitions, are factors which have played an important part in determining
the speed and magnitude of restructuring.
COMPARING DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY IN KOREA AND JAPAN
The two countries have similar development strategies (Kim, 1997). This
similarity may be because industrialization was initiated under the Japanese
rule and/or South Korea was constantly under the influence of Japan, espe-
cially after the start of rapid industrialization in the 1960s (Eckert, 1991;
Kim, 1997). Korea established an economic development strategy based on
the Japanese development model and imported technology from Japan.2
However, the two countries have very different political systems supporting
development. The South Korean state, a comprehensive developmental
state, is authoritarian, while the Japanese state, a limited developmental
state, has a relatively democratic political system (Kim, 1997). This political
difference is an important variable determining development coalitions,
production systems and policy formation.
Development Coalition
Clearly, there is a difference between the development coalitions of both
countries. The Japanese coalition includes all the stakeholders of society,
including the state, business and labor, although the state has been more
important in the decision-making process. In contrast, the Korean coalition
is made up of state and business, and excludes labor.
A. Japanese Coalition
The Japanese development coalition has developed since the Meiji
Restoration of 1868. Economic development in Japan emerged from the
struggle against the foreign threat. The Japanese government realized that
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modernization of the economy was the only way to cope with the threat
when it was forced to open its doors to foreign countries. Therefore, it pur-
sued rapid industrialization under government initiatives.3
However, the government led development strategy soon met with many
problems due to the lower efficiency and corruption in state owned compa-
nies. To cope with this problem, the Japanese government began to encour-
age private businesses to take over public corporations, beginning around
1910. The government retreated from direct involvement in the economy,
and the private sector grew. As some private companies became larger, they
started to organize into business groups, zaibatsu. They expanded their
power and tried to influence government through politicians. Often the suc-
cessful businessmen themselves became politicians. As a result, an alliance
among government, politicians and business was formed, even though the
government economic policy was based on the laissez faire economic princi-
ple.
A new development partner emerged during the 1930s: the military. The
military gained power during the1930s, following assassination and mili-
tary revolt. Even though military leaders hated businessmen and politicians,
they realized that they needed business for their war efforts. The develop-
ment coalition in this period was dominated by military leaders. Politicians
lost much of their influence in the coalition, and businesses held on to their
power, but they were at the mercy of the military. During this period, most
Japanese citizens were excluded and their voice was relatively weak.4
This developmental coalition experienced an abrupt change after World
War II; the military was completely eliminated from the coalition and expe-
rienced business leaders were also purged due to their war effort. Most of
the important pre-war politicians were also pre-empted. Only economic
bureaucrats survived the purge.5 Experienced bureaucrats who had coped
with various economic challenges since early industrialization took control
of rebuilding the Japanese economy after the war.
The bureaucrats’ power bases were varied; they established a tradition of
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3 Government was the only actor at the beginning of modern industry building: it built
everything ranging from economic infrastructure such as roads and harbors, to social infra-
structure including schools and training institutes. As a consequence, the government domi-
nated the economic realm.
4 As improved labor laws showed in this period, there were some positive attempts to
accommodate people’s interests, but these were far from satisfactory.
5 The American occupation force did not disassemble the economic apparatus when they
attempted to re-configure Japanese society during their occupation. Bureaucrats were
untouched due to their necessity for the Allied Occupation Force; they needed Japanese col-
laborators who could help them manage the post-war Japanese economy (Johnson, 1982).
independence from politicians and business, therefore, they earned the rep-
utation of being impartial to the development of Japan. After the war, new
or surviving politicians who lacked knowledge of the economy could not
influence the economic decision-making process. Retired bureaucrats
moved to important positions in the private sector. Bureaucrats-turned-
politicians were quite influential in the process, and were supportive of the
bureaucrats.6 Even legal institutions respect the Japanese bureaucrat’s
authority to deal with economic matters (Johnson, 1982). Japanese bureau-
crats have been unchallenged national leaders in economic building since
the War.
Compared to the previous period, the government had drawn general
support from the people in this period. It had legitimacy to plan and imple-
ment economic policies, even though state power was not as strong as it had
been during the War. Japanese people were more or less unified under gov-
ernment guidance; they accepted government guidance in the economic
development and acknowledged that the intervention of the state was nec-
essary. Japanese bureaucrats are considered to be the best and brightest in
Japan; they have been recruited from the most prestigious educational insti-
tutions. Thus, the power base of Japanese bureaucrats is more or less based
on the consensus of Japanese society. They were the only trained and experi-
enced specialists able to deal with the post war Japanese economy, and they
succeeded in achieving economic development that allowed them to be the
legitimate leaders of the Japanese economic revival. Japanese bureaucrats
also have a very good track record; they have led miraculous economic
development since WWII. The system has been very successful for all
incumbents of society. Although Japanese people were critical of their soci-
ety, economic success was sufficient to satisfy war torn Japan.7
B. Korean Coalition
The Japanese economic development system has influenced the Korean
economic system in many ways. Some researchers argue that the origin of
Korean industrialization can be traced to the period of Japanese occupation
between 1910 and 1945 (Eckert, 1991; Cumings, 1984). Therefore, they are
similar in many respects, but they have different development coalitions.
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6 Various laws also guaranteed their right to intervene in private economic activities. In
addition, Japanese bureaucrats also know how to use their un-written power under the name
of the “private-public corporation,” or administrative guidance.
7 One of the successes of the Japanese economy is the introduction of “total employment,”
which stabilized Japanese society at the macro level, and improved labor relations at the work
level (Gao, 2001:40).
The Korean coalition has been exclusively formed between government
and big business, excluding workers and farmers, whereas the Japanese
coalition is inclusive of all stakeholders.8 The Korean coalition has become
more inclusive of small and medium sized businesses and the middle class,
as economic development progressed. Even so, basic coalition is still
between the state and big business.
This coalition formation is closely related to the colonial legacy. Eckert
(1991) traces the origin of the Korean economic model to Japanese rule in
Korea, while Cumings (1984) believes that the Korean model is based on the
Manchurian model under Japanese rule.9 Eckert points out that the Korean
model inherited many characteristics from Japanese rule, including the
overwhelming predominance of the state in economic affairs, and the subor-
dination of Korean capitalism to its Japanese counterpart. He argues that the
Korean bourgeoisie never possessed a liberal birthright under Japanese rule. 
The leader of the economic development was a former Japanese military
officer, Park Chung Hee, and many of his leading deputies were Japanese
trained bureaucrats. He had come of age in Manchuria in the midst of
depression, war and overwhelming change. He had witnessed a group of
young military officers organize politics, and a group of young Japanese
technocrats quickly build many industries. These technocrats included Kishi
Nobusuke, who later became prime minister of Japan (Cumings, 1997).
Korea and Manchuria under Japanese rule shared similar characteristics;
government, especially under the military rule, coordinated the develop-
ment of the economy, and all sectors were under the control of government.
Economic growth was the ultimate goal, and no other voice was heard.
To achieve this economic success, the state intervened in private economic
activities. An example is the state intervention in labor control. Eckert
argues that harsh labor control during industrialization was evident during
the colonial period (Eckert, 1991). Workers were tied to factories under
unfair contracts, and were forced to work in uncomfortable and dangerous
working environments. Even Japanese factory laws, which barely protected
the labor rights of Japanese workers, were not applicable to workers in
colonies, including Korea.
After 1931, there was an intensification of police control (Eckert, 1991).
Labor was subjected to stringent regulation by the Government-General.
After 1938, as a part of the overall government effort to keep the wartime
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8 Ironically, farmers who contributed to the establishment of industrialization in Korea were
excluded from the coalition (Shin, 1998). 
9 Japan invaded Manchuria, northeastern China and established a puppet government,
Manchukuo, in 1931.
economy functioning at maximum efficiency, the police found themselves in
the business of preventing, as well as ending labor disputes.
The colonial practices were taken over by the newly created South Korean
government. The Korean state was considered to be repressive from the
beginning of independence. Tension between the state and most Korean
people was resolved only after the bloody Korean War, which wiped out
dissidents and created an over-grown state (Choi, 1993; Cumings, 1984).
Using this over-grown state apparatus, the Korean government could have
exerted their power at their own will. The military regime, which assumed
control of the government following a coup, exerted even greater power
than the previous government. They exerted this power without the consent
of the people.
When Park Chung Hee, himself a product of colonial training, decided to
launch an economic program of rapid industrial development, he had a core
of veteran businessmen, many of whom had been tempered not only in the
economic reconstruction of the 1950s, but previously in the rapid industrial
growth of the late 1930s and early 1940s (Cumings, 1997). However, impor-
tant components of Japanese industrial practices, such as lifetime employ-
ment, and harmony between workers and owners, which worked well in
promoting worker-owner solidarity, were omitted in the Korean model.
Instead, the state virtually took over the role of monitoring and controlling
workers;10 big business did not have to pay much attention to controlling
their workers.
Most of Park’s economic deputies were Japanese trained bureaucrats.
Some had training experience in Manchuria, where one of the most success-
ful planned economic developments by Japanese bureaucrats was wit-
nessed. Many Korean collaborators in Manchuria later held important posi-
tions in the South Korean government. As a consequence, Japanese trained
bureaucrats dominated Korean bureaucrats, and formulated economic
development plans which business had to adopt.
Business continued its relationship with the government established dur-
ing Japanese occupation; they cooperated with anybody who held power.
Korean capitalism experienced its first great burst of growth and prosperity
under the repressive Japanese state structure, and by 1945 the Korean bour-
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10 Ironically, the Korean officers who took power in 1961 were simultaneously anti-capitalist
and desperate to build up Korea’s national strength. The junta leadership had a peasant’s sus-
picion of the wealthy. It was really the Manchurian model of military-backed, forced-pace
industrialization that Park had in mind (Cumings, 1997). Park made a deal with ten major
business leaders: they would make good on their “fines” by investing the money in new
industries, and by donating “shares” to the government.
geoisie had become thoroughly conditioned to work within an authoritarian
political framework (Eckert, 1991). Under Japanese rule, the Korean bour-
geoisie found its political position within the native society increasingly
unstable, and they began to rely more and more on the oppressive powers
of the Government-General. After the liberation, it supported the minor, but
American backed political faction that eventually came to power. In return,
business gained various benefits. These included favorable conditions to
take over Japanese properties and to obtain import licenses for scarce mate-
rials such as sugar and flour. This relationship solidified after Park’s eco-
nomic development initiatives. The Park regime believed that economies of
scale would help attain economic development faster than if it established
state-owned enterprises or chose to work with small and medium-sized
enterprises (Kim, 1997). 
The power of the chaebol grew substantially after the demise of military
rule. The coalition between government and business had not been
changed, but large chaebol were yielding considerable influence in the politi-
cal arena.11 One reason is that the state must rely on a certain degree of
autonomy from the capitalists in the process of economic development;
therefore, the state has difficulty in retaining its supremacy over businesses
(Kim, 1997). The other reason is the growing influence of business on politi-
cians through various means, such as building family ties and making polit-
ical contributions. Civilian politicians who needed large sums of money for
their political activities became more dependent on chaebol. The state
rewarded the chaebol who had contributed large sums to various funds cre-
ated by the President’s cronies.12 Top government officials were no longer
the insulated elites, who appeared to make decisions without being influ-
enced by business leaders (Kim, 1997); many politicians used their influence
on the policy making process on behalf of business.
The Korean state has evolved from a coercion based government to a lim-
ited consensus based government, after achieving rapid economic success.
At the beginning of the economic development, a coalition was created
between the state and a small number of businesses that were beneficiaries
of government policies for economic development. However, as the fruit of
rapid economic development started to trickle down to the middle class, the
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11 Frequent attempts by businessmen to run for public offices, including president, signifies
changing relationships between politics and business.
12 When Kukje chaebol was bankrupted and disbanded, government provided incentives to
assist the takeover of insolvent companies. Typically, the incentive included a mix of diverse
measures (Kim, 1997). With these favorable conditions, businesses which were chosen by the
government to take over the insolvent companies had everything to gain and nothing to lose.
coalition started to extend its base. Although the share of the national
wealth was not as generous as in Japan, a substantial number of white-col-
lar workers benefited from this development. This coalition was extended to
some manual workers in core industries, such as heavy industry and the
chemical industry. The power of workers in core sectors also increased due
to democratization; chaebols were forced to make concessions to well orga-
nized workers in core sectors, but they compensated for this loss by squeez-
ing small and medium sized companies that were totally dependent on
them.13
Still, vast numbers of workers in the peripheral sectors and unemployed
workers were marginalized and socially excluded. Excluded people were
workers in peripheral sectors, and the unemployed and peasants, whose
interests were long sacrificed for the sake of development. Workers have
been tightly watched and controlled by the government’s oppressive appa-
ratus, including police, secret police and military.
When the military took over, they need to rationalize their power base.
The necessity of rationalization came from the fact that Korea had a nominal
democracy (Weiss, 1998); therefore, the military regime desperately needed
rationalization, and the ideology of development was chosen. Military
rulers who had a strong affinity with the Japanese military during the occu-
pation chose the “old” Manchurian style development, and made a coalition
with business that excluded labor. This comprehensive developmental state
is presented as an inherently unstable and transitory state structure, since it
has limits embedded in its construct: conflict with the excluded groups such
as workers and peasants. 
C. Comparison of Coalition Bases Between Japan and Korea
The Japanese coalition has been very stable (Gao, 2001). The stability
comes from the fact that it has been an inclusive coalition, guaranteeing the
interests of all participants. This becomes more evident when the Japanese
and Korean coalitions are compared. The Korean coalition had seemed to be
stable, but its legitimacy has been questioned by labor and other excluded
people. Therefore, the coalition in Korea was unstable by nature.
The relationship between business and government appears similar in
both countries; however, they are different in terms of their legitimacy. The
Japanese model drew support from people because the relationship is con-
sidered to be in the public interest; or at least Japanese people acknowledge
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has been increasing.
the relationship to be more or less a necessary vice because it was a part of a
system that produced Japanese economic success. Therefore, even though
the ruling Liberal Democratic Party has been dominant in most periods
since the war, and the party has a strong connection with business and its
constituents, it has enjoyed support from the Japanese people for a long
time. In contrast, the Korean political system continued to experience a
legitimacy crisis, and it often had to rely on sheer force — military and
police — to quell the opposition. Due to the lack of legitimacy, the Korean
political system needed astronomical amounts of money to function. As a
result, most politicians have been directly or indirectly linked to business in
order to receive political contributions.14 Businesses welcomed the requests
for political contributions, as far as they brought in kickbacks. When they
thought the contribution did not bring in what they wanted, there was ten-
sion between government and business. As a result, there have been an
increasing number of chaebol owners who ran for public offices, including
the President. This is an example of the ever-growing power of business
over the state.
In addition, the humble life-style of Japanese managers and their sympa-
thetic attitude toward workers drew Japanese support for the economic sys-
tem. In Korea, however, most business owners do not get the respect of the
people; they are thought to be rich, either due to the favor of government or
by exploiting workers and small and medium sized companies. In addition,
Korean people have a long memory of the historical reality that Korean
business cooperated with Japanese imperialists and Korean dictators. The
chaebol system has long been criticized; it did not get much respect from
people, especially from intellectuals; therefore, the Korean economic system
has long faced the call for restructuring. Even government officials have
long complained about the ever-growing power of chaebol and its abuse of
power for economic interest, at the expense of Korean economic efficiency.
This stability of coalition is especially important in the economic crisis.
Zysman (1983) showed that economic crisis during the 1970s almost
derailed democracy in many countries. However, Japan did not experience
anything close to political crisis resulting from economic crisis, due to its
stable coalition. In the following section, we will discuss how the differences
in stability of the models between Korea and Japan influenced the responses
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14 Ironically, the dependency of politicians on business has grown after the “democratiza-
tion” of Korean society. Under the authoritarian government, politicians received direct mon-
etary, information and even police services from the government in elections and day-to-day
political activity. However, politicians had to raise money and manage their own organiza-
tions and political activities, thus becoming more dependent on business.
to the economic crises.
a. Production Systems
Production systems in both countries appear similar, but differ essentially.
Products and technology are similar, but the way production is organized
differs significantly. Government led economic development strategies and
similar products produced similar factories. The similarity may come from
the fact that Korea imported and copied Japanese economic development
technology. Government has been a strong actor in the Japanese production
system, as in the Korean system. In Japan, at the macro level, the state had
dictated business; what industries should be developed and the direction
industry should take (Johnson, 1982). Macro level guidance was closely
related to the production method at the micro level: a production system
with total employment. The system is an amalgamated one with govern-
ment, business and labor. Micro level considerations on employment also
dictated decisions at the macro level of financial and monetary policies
(Gao, 2001). This system reflected the characteristics of the Japanese coali-
tion; it secured the interest of all stakeholders: government, business and
labor.
This Japanese corporatism has worked successfully. Although industrial
relationships are paternalistic, worker’s rights are relatively well protected
and workers are endowed with relatively high wages and job security. Work
norms are enforced with a certain level of consensus. The wage difference
between white-collar and blue-collar workers is relatively small. In addi-
tion, managers’ wages are not excessively higher than workers, and are
related to the wage increase of workers (Dore, 1998). Therefore, this system
did not create an antagonistic relationship between management and work-
ers at the micro level, and it did not create serious challenges against the
system at the macro level. 
The Korean production system differs from the Japanese system, reflect-
ing the difference in the coalition. It only guarantees the interest of govern-
ment, business and small numbers of middle class and core workers. The
origins of difference can be traced to the colonial era; many South Korean
businesses emulated the Japanese business practices of the period, and
adopted features of the zaibatsu — the only form of modern business they
had known (Kim, 1997). Many chaebol owners gained their first experiences
in modern enterprises by working as low-level technicians or clerical work-
ers for the zaibatsu. When they took over their former employer’s business-
es, they crudely imitated the practices of the zaibatsu. The Korean system
also inherited the labor practice of zaibatsu during occupation: exploitation
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of workers (Eckert, 1991). 
This micro level production system is strongly related to the macro level
development strategy of Korea: development first. The state decided that
labor should be sacrificed for development. The authoritarian government
chose business as its coalition partner, excluding labor (Choi, 1993). The
abuse of labor rights was clear throughout the development period, before
the demise of the authoritarian regime. The secret police and other state
agents were used to discipline and control workers until the advent of
democratization in 1987. 
After the collapse of military rule in 1987, several labor practices were
introduced in core sectors, such as lifetime employment and widening com-
pany welfare privileges. Even then, only few workers in lucrative compa-
nies belonging to chaebol enjoyed the benefits; many workers in small and
medium sized companies were excluded from the benefits of democratiza-
tion. Labor law protection and welfare benefits had not been provided to
most workers in small and medium sized companies, and working condi-
tions for them were not acceptable in many cases. 
Democratization after 1987 put pressure on the Korean production sys-
tem. Although the state had been a supporter of capitalists in Korea, capital-
ists complained of having little support. They needed the state protection in
labor disputes, and from foreign competition in domestic markets, but
abhorred direction from the government on how to manage business. They
demanded “selective control, especially control of the labor movement and
of wages (Kim, 1997).” Excluded from the coalition but newly invigorated,
labor also demanded more welfare and more protection of worker’s rights
from the state. In addition, labor also wanted the state to control and to limit
the increasing power of the chaebols. However, their demands were mostly
ignored.
Unlike the Japanese production system, the Korean system was based on
the coercion of workers by the state, which required a high level of monitor-
ing. The state had faced ever-increasing pressure from both business and
workers after the collapse of the authoritarian regime, and could not satisfy
both of them. As a consequence, it became an unstable system before the
economic crisis hit Korea.
b. Policy Formation
Japan changed economic policies as it experienced many economic diffi-
culties since the start of industrialization. It experimented with various eco-
nomic policies, from a laissez faire economic policy to state intervention, but
eventually settled on developmental policy. After a brief period of state
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owned companies led economic development, Japan adapted a laissez faire
policy. Inefficient and corrupt public companies became burdens of the
state, so the government privatized most public owned companies and
stepped back from direct intervention with the economy. 
This market-oriented policy did not last long as the economic recession
hit; Japan began to adopt the German-style government intervention model.
It attempted to reduce excessive competition by allowing industry to form
cartels. The government also attempted to modernize industry by offering
economic incentives. All these measures were labeled industrial rationaliza-
tion (Johnson, 1982). 
The other line of intervention policy was a fine-tuned allocation of scarce
resources by the government. This policy originated from Japan’s war effort
experience during World War II, but continued after the war. In order to
cope with material shortage caused by the war, the Japanese government
intervened in the allocation process. It continued to do so after the war,
when they faced severe shortages of materials (Johnson, 1982). Even after
the economy started to grow, it continued its role, as there were constant
shortages of scarce resources due to the high growth of the economy. 
An important feature of the Japanese policy formation is that it is based
on broad social consensus. Although bureaucrats and government elites
have leading roles, politicians and business leaders who share similar orien-
tations also participate in the policy making process. However, checks and
balances among politics, the executive branch and business prevent crony-
ism in Japan, even though politicians, bureaucrats and business are interre-
lated by education, local and family backgrounds. As a result, policies in
Japan have been stable and consistent. 
The Korean state held stronger power than the Japanese state. It could
plan the development strategy, and enforce economic actors to follow. The
Korean government’s use of financial institutions to obtain its goals sup-
ports this point. A core element of the Korean model was finance controlled
by government, as was in Japan. If the firm’s performance was poor, or the
firm did not do whatever the state expected, government had the power to
bankrupt the firm the next day by a phone call to the financial institutions,
since the government had total control of financial institutions. This gave
the state tremendous power over companies on investment patterns, mobili-
ty into new industries, and simple day-to-day corporate performance
(Cumings, 1997). The firms that received policy loans were quasi-state orga-
nizations that had common interests with the government, that sank or
swam by following government dictate, and whose leaders were personally
connected to the ruling elites.
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Whereas Japanese bureaucrats are relatively independent, their Korean
counterparts are not. Korean politics dictate bureaucracy in Korea; there-
fore, the autonomy of bureaucrats is limited and the locus of power resides
in the political arena. Business people are relatively weaker than politicians
and bureaucrats, because most companies are heavily dependent on loans
from banks that are controlled by bureaucrats. Politicians, however, depend
on business. Although they hold an edge over bureaucrats and business,
they need large amounts of political contributions to manage political activi-
ties, and to run their political apparatus. There has been widespread specu-
lation that some chaebols have influenced politicians and government
bureaucrats with bribes and through personal and familial relationships.
The 1989 Hearings for the Fifth Republic at the National Assembly revealed
that many of the largest chaebol, including Hyundai, were accused of bribery
and political kickbacks (Kim, 1997). As seen in many political scandals,
Korean politicians have often been found to interfere with the government
decision-making process on behalf of business. As a consequence, policy
making in Korea is often a result of haggling among three parties: bureau-
crats, politicians and chaebols. The process has been murky, and lacked legit-
imacy.
Democratization, along with increased power of organized labor, could
have increased the possibility to include labor in policy formation processes;
however, the state and business have kept labor from the process. This
exclusion created tension in policy formation. Labor, with increased power,
received some wage increases, but could not influence the process. Labor
became hostile towards the alliance between the state and businesses, and
many policies were not supported by the people, regardless of their merits.
In sum, bureaucrats monopolized policy formation at the beginning of
industrialization during the 1960s, reflecting the interests of the state and
business. The power of business has grown in the process of industrializa-
tion. This practice resulted in the coalition between the state and business,
at the exclusion of labor. It faced challenges after the demise of the authori-
tarian government during the late 1980s, and strained the alliance between
politicians and business, and labor.
SOURCE OF AND RESPONSE TO ECONOMIC CRISES
The Japanese and Korean economic crises appeared similar, but differed
in speed and length. The differences may have called for different respons-
es. In addition, although there were similar imperatives for change, the
institutional difference could have created different responses. Korea and
242 DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIETY 
Japan might have responded to the crises based on their own socio-political
characteristics, and this could have led to different economic changes. 
Japan experienced various economic crises since the beginning of indus-
trialization in the late 19th century, and it had responded to them more or
less successfully with varying development policies. However, lingering
economic recession during the 1990s, the focus of the current discussion, is
an exception. The long record of success in Japan satisfied the broad inter-
ests of most Japanese, and may have also made the Japanese reluctant to
adopt a new economic system. Korea also experienced many crises since the
independence of 1945, and had overcome economic difficulties, but primari-
ly by sacrificing and excluding most workers and farmers. Therefore, when
the role of the Korean economic system was in question, most workers and
farmers demanded change. Without the coalition supporting the system, the
Korean economic system could not be preserved.
Japanese Economic Crisis
Porter et al. (2000) illustrate how deep the recent Japanese economic
recession is: “Real estate prices have plummeted by as much as 78%. The
Nikkei stock price index, which peaked at 38,915 yen in December 1989, had
only recovered to the 20,000 range by early 2000. Unemployment hit a
record high in 1999, topping the U.S. jobless rate for the first time.” They
argue that internal factors are related to the crisis; first, the burst of the bub-
ble economy of over-valued equities and real estate in the early 1990s. The
collapse of asset prices hit the banking industry hard, resulting in a credit
crunch. As the value of collateral plummeted, all economic actors were in
debt, which suppressed consumption and investment. Second, over-regula-
tion and overprotection by the government distorted and undermined busi-
ness competition. Third was mismanagement of macroeconomics by the
government, including untimely tax raises, failing to stimulate domestic
demand and clinging to a policy of export-led growth. Krugman (1994)
summarized the causes of the problem as input driven economy; govern-
ment intervention in the economy created unnecessary competition in some
markets and over-protection of the domestic market without increase in
productivity. This inefficient economy would eventually stagnate. 
Other studies show that external factors also contributed to the crisis, in
addition to internal factors. Late-late developers such as Korea and Taiwan
emerged, began to compete with Japan, and eroded Japanese market share
in the world (Johnson, 1982). Japan was squeezed by late-late developers
like Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore and China, and by
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advanced countries with niche markets such as Germany and other
European countries (Ohmae, 1990). Changes in international politics also
negatively influenced the Japanese economy (Cumings, 1997; Johnson,
2000). During the Cold War, the U.S. reluctantly accepted the loss from trade
deficits, and encouraged the growth of allied countries such as Japan, Korea
and Taiwan. However, after the collapse of Communism, the U.S. no longer
accepted this situation. The U.S. pressured Japan to open its markets, and to
take other measures allowing U.S. companies access to Japanese markets,
thus contributing to the demise of Japanese dominance in world markets.
Gao (2001) recognizes the importance of external factors, and how Japan
has responded to these factors. However, he pays more attention to domes-
tic institutions. He notices that the state, business and labor built a closed
system. In return for support from the state, business offered permanent
employment and other forms of company welfare for labor, which, in
return, secured political stability. Therefore, “the Japanese economic system
may contain the seeds for stagnation. As the interests of each major distribu-
tional coalition are locked into the present economic structure, the political
system loses the dynamics to break the equilibrium in support of reform
(Gao, 2001).”
The Major Obstacles to Change in Japan
Most Japanese accept that change is needed (Dore, 1998). Almost every
politician, professor or pundit talks about the need for restructuring, and
most can produce their own “radical” plan (Economist, December 13, 2001).
Suggestions for restructuring can be divided into two mandates: abandon
the developmental state and restructure financial institutions. Financial
institutions have been tools of the developmental state; the state used them
to implement its policies, including industrial policies. Porter et al. (2000)
argue that government should not guide business, and should make the
economic system more flexible. Foreign observers argue that much privati-
zation, deregulation and fiscal restructuring are needed for the re-start of
the Japanese economy, along with efforts to lift the huge burden of bad
debts off the shoulders of commercial banks (For example, Economist,
December 13, 2001). Despite these recommendations, progress in economic
restructuring has been slow for two reasons: the urgency is not sufficient,
and ‘a closed system’ of interrelated interest groups of Japanese economic
blocks also needs economic restructuring.
Although Japan experienced economic recession, it is not desperate yet.
The unemployment rate was 5.4% as of 2001; this rate is very high com-
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pared with previous figures, but it is still acceptable in most other countries.
Although the current unemployment rate is high for many Japanese, it does
not threaten the stability of the Japanese system yet. Also, the still perform-
ing economy and deflation alleviates the pain from rising unemployment.
Economists report that “unemployment has risen, but only to 5.4% of the
workforce. Incomes have been declining, but only gently, and there have
been higher rewards for the most talented. ... With prices falling by around
1% a year, life is becoming more affordable (Economist, December 13, 2001).”
Considering that the current economy is worrisome but not desperate, the
pill of restructuring the economy is hard to swallow; restructuring requires
overhaul of the system, which has successfully protected the interests of all
participants. Current development was possible and is sustained by the
Japanese development model (Cumings, 1984; Johnson, 1982; Gao, 2001).
This successful system is tightly knitted; therefore, change of one system
causes change in the other sectors. Although this system is facing serious
challenges, economic actors will hesitate to reform as it has been so success-
ful for so long. The change will be expensive and painful for most, and it is
not clear whether it would bring in further economic prosperity for all
stakeholders. Therefore, the old system itself hinders economic restructur-
ing in Japan.
Korean Economic Crisis
Economic crisis hit Korea by surprise in 1997. Both supporters and critics
of the Korean development model did not expect such a sudden and severe
economic crisis (Krugman, 1998). This crisis resulted from the combination
of various internal and external factors. Internal factors are related to ‘crony
capitalism’: resource allocation by favoritism. Critics of the Korean model
argue that the developmental state is closely related to this problem.
Although crony capitalism has been criticized, Korean economic develop-
ment was successful with cronyism before the economic crisis; therefore,
cronyism alone cannot explain the crisis (Radelet and Sachs, 1998).
However, it is true that corruption and cozy relationships between govern-
ment and chaebol contributed to a less efficient economy in the long run
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TABLE 1. THE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE IN JAPAN (%)
Year 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Unemployment rate 1.1 1.9 2.0 1.56 1.34 2.10 3.20
Source: Labor Force Survey, Statistics Bureau, Management and Coordination Agency.
(Krugman, 1998).
External factors are presented in a context of changed international rela-
tionships. Korea was a major recipient of American aid and was allowed
free access to U.S. technology and markets (Cumings, 1984; Johnson, 1982;
Vogel, 1991). The collapse of Communism, however, drastically reduced the
importance of Korea as a bulwark against the expansion of Communism.
Korea could no longer expect favorable treatment as before from the U.S.
and Japan. Instead, it was forced to open domestic markets and to ‘self regu-
late’ the ceiling of export for some goods to the U.S. When the Japanese
economy was in trouble, the U.S. allowed Japan to depreciate Japanese cur-
rency against the U.S. dollar. The depreciation of the Yen caused serious eco-
nomic disturbance among Asian countries. They lost competitiveness due to
the relative appreciation of the domestic currency, and Korea was one of
these troubled countries (Johnson, 2000; Wade, 2000). This account based on
external factors cannot explain why the crisis started in 1997, but it gives us
information on the external pressures that the Korean economy faced.
The Korean economy fell into serious trouble as South East Asian coun-
tries began to experience economic crises. Foreign investors who lost confi-
dence in this region began to pull out of Korea, causing a foreign currency
crisis: the stampede of foreign investors (Radelet and Sachs, 1998). As most
Korean companies depended on over-loans from banks, economic crisis was
unavoidable when foreign capital began to move out of Korea. The foreign
currency crisis ushered in the crises of financial institutions and companies,
and eventually the crisis of the Korean economy.
Even though the causes of the Korean crisis were varied and seemed to be
external, Korean people believed that incompetent bureaucrats and ineffi-
cient chaebols caused the crisis. They blamed the developmental state model.
Unlike the Japanese model, the Korean development state model had faced
criticism and at best it had been considered as a necessary, but transient
vice. Therefore, people demanded the demolition of the development state
when they faced the economic crisis. Ironically, the restructuring was sup-
ported by the people, but its result reflected the structure of the old devel-
opment coalition. 
The state implemented restructuring with the help of chaebol; the end
result is the preservation of state power and protection of chaebols’ interests.
Facing economic crisis, the Korean government began to restructure the
economy. The restructuring includes the financial, corporate, public and
labor sectors. The financial sector was hit hard; almost 40 percent of workers
were laid off. Several measures were taken in the corporate sector for trans-
parent and efficient management, including specialization and change of
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governance systems. Several state-owned companies in the public sector
were privatised, and the number of workers in the public sectors was
reduced. Despite reform in the public sector, the power of bureaucrats, how-
ever, remains strong. Corporate reform also maintained market share and
the importance of chaebol in the Korean economy. 
Although the demand of the people for restructuring was the dismantling
of the development state, the results have been strengthening business and
preserving bureaucratic power. The major culprits of the crisis, the chaebols,
were forced to run transparent management and to lower the ratio of loans
to total assets. However, in return, they received flexible employment and
less interference from government, and overall are the beneficiaries of the
reform. 
The most successful restructuring was observed in the labor sector.
Several legal clauses that prevented lay-offs were abolished, and the use of
temporary workers in most sectors was allowed for more flexible employ-
ment. As a result, many workers lost stable jobs and became either unem-
ployed or temporary workers. At the beginning of restructuring in 1998,
organized labor was reluctant to change the labor laws for fear of increased
unemployment, atypical workers and losing the power base of trade
unions.15 The change of labor laws for ‘flexible employment’ has taken
away stable employment. The evident losers of economic restructuring are
workers with stable employment.
Facilitators of Korean Restructuring
Factors that facilitated the restructuring of the Korean economy originat-
ed from the incomplete alliance among major economic actors. Coercion has
been a necessity to sustain the Korean development model, since repression
was required to subdue labor (Cumings, 1997; Choi, 1993). The Korean sys-
tem has been intrinsically unstable, but it could have existed as far as it con-
tinued to grow and trickled down the fruit of economic development to the
middle class and workers in core sectors.
The altered economic and political environment had also demanded
change. The growing trade deficit between the U.S. and several East Asian
nations increased pressure from the U.S. and other countries to implement a
series of economic liberalization and internationalization measures16 (Kim,
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15 Most Korean trade union memberships are composed of workers with stable employment
in chaebol companies and state owned companies.
16 Gao (2001) calls this a correction of “asymmetric corporation” between U.S. and ally
countries.
1997). Korea was protected by the U.S., but this protection had been
removed after the collapse of Communism. Democratization also con-
tributed to the demise of the model. The military’s loss of power after the
June 1987 civil revolt reduced the power of state. Mandates to change the
economy seemed to be more evident after the establishment of successive
civilian governments.
The lack of legitimacy of the Korean model also called for change; there
has been consistent criticism of the state led economy. Without government
restraint, chaebol exhibited avaricious appetites for domestic markets, at the
price of small and medium sized companies. As a result, their behavior had
been deplored by the Korean people. 
The newly emerged bureaucrats who were influenced by “free market”
theorists in Kim Young Sam’s government17 had different views on the old
role of government. They blamed the previous regime’s state-led, over-
investment in heavy industries for the negative growth of the 1980s. They
argued that the chaebol based Korean economy should be modified. Radical
scholars were especially critical of the model, labeling the Korean economy
as a system just for chaebol, and not for the people. 
The sole pillar supporting the system was the successful economic perfor-
mance of the system. Government and business were on the lifeline of eco-
nomic performance without legitimacy. The majority of Koreans, with the
exception of a small percentage of the emerging middle class, resented the
concentration of the economy in the hands of chaebol. However, they, espe-
cially middle class, accepted the economic structure, as they could not find
any successful alternative. Therefore, government and business alliances,
with a small proportion of the growing middle class coalition, had been
resilient to the criticism.
When the economy was near collapse in 1997, however, everybody either
demanded dismantling the old system, or withdrew their support. Korea
easily reached consensus that the old system was seriously flawed, and
needed to be abandoned. Just after the foreign currency crisis of 1997, the
opposition party candidate won the presidential election, for the first time
in Korean history. The new president had long been a critic of the old eco-
nomic model, and had promised swift economic reform if he was elected.
An important point is that although serious economic problems and a
new government surely influenced the change of the system, what really
brought the change was public opinion against the Korean development
coalition. People who had been excluded from the coalition had lost confi-
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17 The government before Kim Dae Jung’s current government between 1993-1997.
dence, and regarded the model as a major cause of economic catastrophe.
Facing a landslide of changing opinions about the Korean model, economic
bureaucrats and business could no longer protect the system.18
CONCLUDING REMARKS: PROSPECTS FOR RESTRUCTURING IN TWO
COUNTRIES
Korea has restructured its economy relatively more successfully than
Japan did. There are various explanations why Korea was more successful.
One explanation is the differential level of urgency of economic crisis that
each country experienced. Although the Japanese crisis has lingered over 10
years, it is not as severe as the Korean crisis. The sudden and severe crisis in
Korea allowed swift and broad restructuring. Facing disastrous economic
downturn, no actors in the economy could resist the restructuring. The new
president from the first horizontal change of power in Korean history after
the crisis, who was considered relatively progressive in Korean politics, was
also believed to have helped lessen labor resistance, which was considered a
major opposition to restructuring. President Kim Dae Jung had persuaded
labor in pushing his restructuring agenda.
This paper, however, argues that the single most important factor for the
change came from the flaw of the development coalition in the Korean eco-
nomic model. Other contributing factors to the crisis have existed since the
start of industrialization in Korea; however, the Korean model continued to
be resilient with these flaws. The discontented majority who were excluded
from the development coalition discredited the Korean model long before
the crisis, but remained dormant due to coercion and later, to a lack of alter-
natives to the developmental model. Facing sudden and severe economic
crisis, people demanded the demolition of the system, and the state and
chaebol coalition could not defend the system.
The argument that the flaws of the Korean coalition contributed to the
rapid change of the economy is indirectly supported by the Japanese case.
Although lingering recession is real and necessary for restructuring, the cur-
rent economic system is still performing and serving the interest of the
Japanese people relatively well (Gao, 2001). The transition will be long and
painful, and may make the system unstable. In addition, the result of
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18 The Korean economy is heavily dependent on the world economy. It cannot survive with-
out the support of foreign countries, especially of the USA. These countries demanded change
of the Korean economic model. During the crisis, Korea had to accept the demand. This weak
position of Korea in the world economy may partly explain the difference between Japan and
Korea, in addition to institutional characteristics of the Korean economic system.
change is uncertain; the change of the system does not guarantee new pros-
perity for all. As a consequence, change is and will be slow, unless Japan
faces sudden and severe downturn as South Korea experienced in 1997,
which is strong enough to dismantle the current development coalition.
Old institutions have inertia. Old Korean economic institutions still influ-
ence the new direction of change. The Korean government attempted to
reform four major sectors of the Korean economy: the financial, corporate,
public and labor sectors. Among these, labor reform was most successful.
The flexibility of labor was very successful, such that Korea has become one
of the most flexible countries in employment, with the highest proportion of
temporary workers. For example, in the financial sector, more than 40 per-
cent of employees were laid-off. In contrast, chaebols are still expanding: cor-
porate sector reform is constantly criticized by foreign news media (New
York Times, 2001). As was with the old coalition, labor has become the scape-
goat, and chaebols are still holding their power.
The state is not losing its power. Though many critics argue that the gov-
ernment in Korea should reduce its role in the economy, Korea still needs
government guidance. Chaebols are rampant, and need to be checked by
government. The role of the government should be changed, but the direc-
tion is still unclear. One line of argument is that it should incorporate more
regulatory state functions, but some argue that government should main-
tain the developmental function.
Regardless of the future role of the Korean state, if the new Korean model
aims to achieve stability, two goals should be achieved: severing cozy rela-
tionships between politics and business, and including labor into the coali-
tion. It is clear that without change of the Korean political structure and
practices, successful restructuring of the Korean economy seems impossible.
Politics that can influence bureaucrats are under the influence of business.
Korean politicians need a lot of money to manage their political organiza-
tions, and much of the money is distilled from business, legally and illegal-
ly. If this practice is not changed, Korean politicians will not give up their
efforts to influence the policy-making process in favor of business. Changes
influenced by politicians will be distorted to preserve politicians’ power to
influence the economy.
Korean workers have been excluded from decision-making processes, and
it has been a source of the instability of the Korean model. Korean workers’
militancy could be an important factor in determining the future of the new
economy. Although labor has been somewhat subdued, it can be reinvigo-
rated when workers feel that they are not treated justly, especially under the
corrupt and pro-chaebol government. Therefore, the stability of the system
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can be influenced by the decision of whether or not to include labor as a
new coalition partner.
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